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Feeling in Theory: Emotion after the ‘‘Death of the Subject’’ by Rei Terada. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001. Pp. 224. $46.00 cloth.
The ‘‘death of the subject’’ heralded in poststructuralist theory challenges
some pivotal assumptions in the philosophy of emotion. Most pointedly, we
are led to ask whether the subject, whose presence is no longer assured, is
nonetheless necessary to ‘‘do’’ the feeling. Rei Terada responds to this question
firmly and in detail: not only is emotion not ‘‘subjective,’’ she argues, but ‘‘we
would have no emotions if we were subjects’’ (4). From her perspective, we
have clearly crossed the divide: the death of subjectivity is secure. But, its demise has left emotional experience dangling somewhere between intellectual
desiccation and nostalgic reversion to the ‘expressive hypothesis.’ Terada’s objective is to replace that hypothesis with a discourse of emotion that is faithful
to the pathos of Derrida’s deconstruction of presence and de Man’s deconstruction of prosopopeia.
The path toward that replacement is restlessly traveled, passing through
the territory of scholars as diverse as Daniel Dennett, Ronald de Sousa, Edmund Husserl, Gilles Deleuze, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and, of course, Jacques
Derrida and Paul de Man. Such breadth has risks: it is not easy to coordinate
these diverse forms of scholarship, and the occasional missteps along the way
are worrisome. For example, to frame the issue, Terada refers in passing to
psychological research by Schacter and Singer, suggesting that Husserl was a
‘‘precursor’’ to their ‘‘content approach’’ to emotion. Not only would these
neo-positivistic authors be stunned to learn of their imputed phenomenological heritage, but Terada assimilates their concern with the labelling of feeling
sensations (e.g., as ‘‘anger’’) to her own concern with the intentionality of feeling acts (e.g., what anger is ‘‘about’’). And yet, there are, to this reviewer’s
knowledge, very few such missteps in this volume; in general the author’s arguments are effectively grounded—and documented—in relevant sources.
Terada begins by revisiting the Derridean critique of Husserl’s phenomenological account of the living present. Her reinstatement of that critique may
be difficult for a reader not independently versed in the subtitles of Derrida’s
Speech and Phenomena (trans. David Allison [Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973/1967]), and it may seem presumptive to a reader who is
not already acquainted with Derrida’s explication of self-distribution (cf. Leonard Lawlor, Derrida and Husserl [Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press,
2002]). Nonetheless, this reinstatement is critical to Terada’s objectives. Husserl’s description of the immediacy of auto-affective subjectivity is contrasted
with Derrida’s account of the contamination of auto-affective interiority by exteriority; Husserl’s description of the expression of ideality within subjectivity
is contrasted with Derrida’s account of the self-differential non-immediacy of
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re-presentation; and, most importantly, Husserl’s portrayal of the idealized expression of emotion is contrasted with the pathos that seems inevitable within
the self-differential non-immediacy of re-presentation. ‘‘Emotion demands virtual self-difference—an extra ‘you’ ’’ (31), concludes Terada, opening the way
to consideration of fictive courage within Kant’s version of the sublime, the virtual ‘‘you’’ within Rousseau’s discussion of theatrical imagination, and the personified tropes within de Man’s portrayal of the nominative force of emotion.
The realm of analogy, metaphor, and irony opened by Derrida’s discussion of pathos becomes the site for Terada’s articulation, primarily through de
Man’s Allegories of Reading, of different types of self-differential emotion. Fear,
she argues, is the flight from suspended meaning, from figural distrust, toward
literal (or faux-figural) reference to a locus of ‘‘danger.’’ Love, similarly, is the
flight from vacillation between ipseity and alterity toward the literal (or fauxliteral) identification of a ‘‘beloved.’’ In general, Terada argues, emotion is the
gradual resolution of nameless uncertainty through nominative acts, a tropological shift—or, more precisely, flight—from fictive to more nearly literal
meaning.
The character of this shift locates emotion within the realm of bad faith
or, despite its self-centering connotations, self-deception. ‘‘Interest’’ (63) and
‘‘deception’’ (63), phrases that can be (and, in Terada’s text, occasionally are)
self-referential (e.g., self-interest, self-deception), suggest the displaced reconstruction of an egoic centre that purposively and deceptively acts. And yet, the
figurative ‘‘flight’’ from pathos that Terada posits seems to betray the (plural?)
self-relational nuances that would warrant the language of self-deception. This
dilemma becomes especially salient when considering that ‘‘particularly bizarre corner of de Man’s world in which personified concepts and figures go
around deceiving themselves and one another in a kind of masked ball for abstractions’’ (66). Personifications within this theatre remain figuratively related, but it is unclear whether these figurative relations support the
attribution of self-deception, i.e., of one egoic center ‘‘deceiving’’ another (cf.
Fingarette, Self-deception [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969]). To
complete her account of personified emotions, an equally nuanced discussion
of self-deception—and of the possibility of its allegorical ‘‘undoing’’—seems
necessary.
After presenting the basic form of her theory, Terada examines several
other theories that vary in their ‘‘openness to nonsubjective emotion’’ (91). She
works her way through selected aspects of the work of Peter Kivy (the difficulty of identifying the subjective locus of the expressiveness of music), Ronald de Sousa (the challenge of reconciling singular emotions with the
iterability of intentionality), Daniel Dennett (the materialist struggle to provide
a cognitive model of emotional qualia without a subjective witness), and Deleuze (the effort to spell out a nonsubjective conception of expression). This
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phase in Terada’s discussion provides the kind of clarification that emerges
through comparison, primarily in the form of contrasts between these authors’
perspectives and her own.
However, these comparisons seem to postpone pursuit of the author’s primary objectives. And later she does return to her own primary enterprise by
reviewing Derrida’s Memoires for Paul de Man. Here she persuasively demonstrates and documents the self-distributed thinking that generates unspeakable
grief. Her discussion of responsibility, of how to say ‘‘come’’ and to answer the
‘‘come’’ of the other, makes present, however tentatively, the fecundity of a
conversation that is infinitely open because ‘‘interlocking internal divisions
turn each thesis toward its antithesis’’ (146). Her discussion exemplifies but
does not yet articulate a response to the complications that her theory presents
for subject-centred accounts of sincerity, authenticity, and integrity. Without
the forced oppositions and affected polysemy of some deconstructionist writing, these pages compellingly demonstrate the lively pathos that has no determinate locus but that allows the personifications of psyche and prosopopeia
reciprocally to enhance rather than obscure each other.



Don Kuiken
University of Alberta

Situatedness, or, Why We Keep Saying Where We’re Coming From by David Simpson. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2002. Pp. xii Ⳮ 290.
$54.95 cloth, $18.95 paper.
David Simpson knows that he has assigned himself a difficult task. By
writing a book about ‘’situatedness’’ he courts the danger of writing ‘‘a book
about everything’’ (4). For ‘‘situatedness’’ carries with it ‘‘nothing less than the
entire predicament of being in the world’’ (9)—the questions of how the various biological and social contexts we occupy do or do not determine who we
are, what we think, and what we do. One of Simpson’s aids in organizing this
huge subject is the ‘‘azza sentence’’ (41–47), a familiar act of preemptive selfdefinition such as: ‘‘As a post-colonial feminist ethnographer, I . . .’’. The
speaker of the azza sentence combines a necessary humility with a residual
claim of authority: Because no one can claim a transcendent position, those
who use the azza acknowledge that their authority emerges from a particular,
limited position that shapes who they are and bounds what they know. But
within that realm their authority is credible. While honoring the progressive
impulse behind the azza and rejecting nostalgia for objective knowledge,
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Simpson relentlessly exposes the appeal to situatedness as a symptom rather
than a solution to the epistemological and political crises that dog us.
In this effort, he devotes a chapter each to law, sociology, literature, and
philosophy, moving without pomposity or clotted prose from Clarence Darrow’s defense of Leopold and Loeb to John Stuart Mill’s conflicted wish for a
probabilistic social science and individual liberty to Sartre’s uneasy intertwining of biography and philosophy in his studies of Flaubert and Stalin. Along
with remarkable erudition, wit is another of the book’s many strengths. See,
for instance, his pithy summary of Seyla Benhabib’s recourse to dialogue
within radically situated communities as a way of avoiding Cartesian individualism while preserving individual agency and rationalism: ‘‘ ‘We are, therefore,
I think’ ’’ (203).
What links all of these cases is what Simpson calls an ‘‘aporia’’ of situatedness. Situatedness promises knowledge but in practice leaves us in a cloud of
unknowing about our place in the world. This is because we have certain
knowledge neither about the degree to which various forces may be shaping
us nor how individual agency can be squared with these determinations. So
although the rise of the azza sentence may register our wish for a life free of
the difficulties of knowing in a world without master narratives (204), it is
merely a wish. The ubiquity of this desire suggests an instability in the entity
who is both the effect and the justification of our political and economic systems—‘‘his majesty the subject’’ (9). That instability, in turn, may betoken
some profound change on the horizon.
Up to this point, it’s a persuasive account, and that is saying a great deal.
But Simpson is less satisfying when specifying the nature of this stress and the
change it portends. The problem can be traced to how Simpson presents a
discourse featured in Simpson’s previous book as well as in this one—
literature. In The Academic Postmodern and the Rule of Literature (1995), he interrogated the turn by philosophy, anthorpology, and other discourses toward
anecdote, autobiography, and other literary modes. Although he tended in that
book to present literature primarily as a signifier of cultural capital, he also
allowed that ‘‘literature has never quite managed to set itself off from the demotic narratives that provide its not-so-binary antagonists’’ (see The Academic
Postmodern and the Rule of Literature: A Report on Half-Knowledge [Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1995], 18). In Situatedness, however, literature is
revealed as merely one of many vehicles for the aporia of situatedness and thus
‘‘may have no more or less to teach us than other forms of inquiry’’ (144). His
‘‘bold statement’’ is that literature’s ‘‘purpose, consciously or otherwise, has
been the cultivation of aporia,’’ for it ‘‘represents situatedness while sidestepping or denying the urge to solve or factor it out in exact or limiting terms’’
(142; 121).
But the readings that result from this claim seem less than bold. To cite
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two instances, the interpretation of Robinson Crusoe seems little more than an
elegant restatement of the hoary ‘‘individual-vs-society’’ structure and the assertion that The Prelude cannot account for the self because it is always deferred by the writing of the self seems little more than a basic poststructuralism Simpson exceeded in his own earlier works, like Irony and Authority in Romantic Poetry (1979).
The more serious problem is that Simpson’s approach flattens the pasts,
presents, and potential futures of different discourses. This is perhaps to be
expected in a book emphasizing a phenomenon larger than any particular discourse. Still, this treatment of literature works against his stated goal of figuring out how we might think past the knot of situatedness. Doesn’t it matter
that, in comparison to literary theory or sociology, literature has been permeated and even perforated by forms of knowledge and value that may provide
different takes on ‘‘situatedness’’—say, in the Songs of Blake or ‘‘the Sorrow
Songs’’ in W. E. B. DuBois’s The Souls of Black Folk? Doesn’t it make sense to
highlight the fact that literature underscores aporia while tort law simply denies it and the phenomenology of Husserl seeks to solve it too quickly?
For Simpson the answer is, in the end, ‘‘no.’’ All discourses are equally
complicit in disabling us from solving the riddle of situatedness. His stance is
due in part to an admirable skepticism toward the power accorded to the literary by recent literary theory. But it is also due, I think, to a murkiness concerning: 1) the relationship of any particular discourse to power and 2) the
ontology of what rigs the game of situatedness to make it seem as if ‘‘[l]ife requires the withholding of truth.’’ (130).
What is it that requires this ignorance so that we might live? The answer
appears to be ‘‘modernity’’ itself: ‘‘[M]odernity’s vocation has only pretended
to be the solution of the questions arising from situatedness. Its real goal,
which it has achieved very well in the liberal-democratic nation-states, has
been the management of extremes, the setting of limits to the more dangerous
energies of a risk culture that is fundamentally committed to the positive evaluation of those same risks for its own purposes’’ (144). The key phrase, ‘‘risk
culture,’’ is drawn from Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society. Frequently cited by Simpson, it holds that the complexity of modern life vitiates the purchase that individuals have on what controls their lives. And yet that very system teaches us
to believe individual choices do make a profound difference. The name of that
system is ‘‘capitalism, or late capitalism, or liberal democracy, or modernity—it is something of each of these’’ (191). On one hand, ‘‘modernity’’ requires ‘‘a manageable citizenry’’ to whom it must deny ‘‘access to ideas about
radical self-determination’’ (193). On the other, it must value various forms of
the motility required by global capital. It must deterritorialize tradition and
celebrate the entrepreneur currently starring in financial pages and stump
speeches, not to mention school curricula.
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Here, though, we may see the revenge of the literary in one of its most
familiar tropes—personification. For (to indulge in a bit of basic post-structuralism myself ) the ‘‘modernity’’ that Simpson conjures seems awfully close to a
personification—armed with the will-to-power necessary to animate subjects
to think of themselves as persons fully endowed with agency. This Modernity
is a potent figure that works its mystifying magic through discourses as disparate as phenomenology and the debate over what caused the Columbine
shootings. Modernity makes it impossible to tell the difference between a contradiction that furthers the enthralling goals of Modernity and something that
might give us purchase on that very ideology.
To be fair, Simpson ends by offering suggestions to avoid reductiveness of
this sort. Turning to J. L. Austin’s notion that our vocabulary is bound to involve ‘‘disparate’’ models, he urges us to acknowledge that claims for group
identity and individual agency are not absolute. Nor can they be reconciled.
But their fuzziness and irreconcilability do not render them useless as long as
we see their limits, and Simpson then sketches how doing so would help clarify current debates over affirmative action, income distribution, and the death
penalty (238–47). So a proper skepticism about the knowledge we gain from
situatedness could save us from being Modernity’s stooges (198).
But doesn’t this ‘‘ecology of ignorance’’ (a term borrowed from Niklas
Luhmann) risk reproducing the ignorance cultivated by Modernity? In response Simpson can offer ‘‘only once again a faith in history’’ (197). I would
have more faith in Simpson’s faith, however, if the history he tells in this book
were more perspicuous concerning the relationship of modernity to language
and ideology. It is somewhat disappointing that the closest we get to a model
of ideology beyond Althusserian interpellation is the fleeting observation that
Simpson doesn’t assume that it is he who is being hailed (32–33). Neither does
he provide any concrete examples of what it might be to think outside of the
aporia of situatedness in a credible way, either from the present or the past. Presumably Modernity has not always existed, and presumably it exerts different
gravities in different spaces even within ‘‘late first-world anglophone’’ nations.
One figure he might have made better use of in this regard is Fredric
Jameson. Although Simpson frequently cites him and Jameson’s blurb can be
found on the back cover, this book could do with a more-Jamesonian sense
of the subtle and unpredictable relationships between language, ideology, and
history—for instance, a sense of how style provides an insight into the contradictions of modernity and postmodernity. Perhaps we might think of the azza
sentence as a rhetorical figure that carries with it certain assumptions about
how language represents the reality that ‘‘modernity’’ puts forth. But this
would provide only limited help because Simpson does not sufficiently detail
the work done by language and in part because ‘‘modernity’’ remains here too
much of a puppet master.
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As an alternative, we might then turn to a text that Simpson could not
have read before sending off his manuscript, Jameson’s A Singular Modernity:
Essay on the Ontology of the Present (London: Verso, 2002). There, he warns us
against invoking modernity as an explanatory concept and argues instead that
it is a ‘‘narrative category’’ that can be represented only through considering
‘‘situations’’ rather than focusing on a ‘‘subjectivity’’ that is, properly speaking,
unrepresentable (40–57). If we are still animated by a Utopian wish to dethrone ‘‘his majesty the subject,’’ Jameson directs us to consider the yearning
for de-personalization he detects in Rilke, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger, among
others, a desire that may help us see what lies beyond the aridity of our current
situation in modernity (131–38).
In contrast, the history that Simpson conjures looks more like a ground
that consumes all figures. It becomes difficult to understand from which position within ‘’situatedness’’ we might see some modification of it or what aspects
of situatedness may or may not be attached to a history beyond Modernity. It
thus looks too much like the faith of the historicist in history, a too-unexamined
faith that limits a witty, learned, and otherwise very useful book.



Steve Newman
Temple University

Mammon’s Music: Literature and Economics in the Age of Milton by Blair Hoxby.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002. Pp. 320. $40.00 cloth.
Blair Hoxby’s Mammon’s Music: Literature and Economics in the Age of Milton is an ambitious, compellingly argued book which will be essential reading
for Miltonists, scholars of the seventeenth century generally and anyone interested in the relationship between literature and economic thought in the early
modern period. Focusing on Milton but offering careful readings of Dryden’s
and Davenant’s poetry and marshaling atlases, paintings, statuary and public
architecture both Dutch and English, Hoxby argues that Milton’s writing and
the poetry of his age are deeply engaged with a public discourse of trade. Beginning with A Maske Presented at Ludlow Castle and ending with Samson Agonistes, Hoxby demonstrates that Milton is, in fact, an economic thinker but also
that his ideas changed considerably in relation to the political developments
of the Revolution, Interregnum and Restoration. Ultimately however, Hoxby
finds a consistency in Milton’s position: ‘‘from beginning to end Milton opposed the ‘great Marchants of this world’ whether they took the form of monopolistic churchmen or chartered companies. He consistently attacked fixed
forms and visible powers and in doing so, he made various uses of that strain
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of economic analysis that sought to describe the power of independent initiatives and invisible processes’’ (237). Hoxby makes his case persuasively and in
detail, paying careful attention to the terms of seventeenth-century debates
and to poetic echoes and appropriations of explicitly economic discourse.
Mammon’s Music is divided into four sections. The first deals with A Maske
and Areopagitica, the second with Republican and Royalist discourses of trade,
the third with the Restoration, Dryden, Davenant, Denham, and Cooper as
well as Paradise Lost, and the fourth with the discourse of work and building
after the Great Fire, and its relation to Samson’s labors in the mill. In the first
section Hoxby both establishes Milton’s involvement with economic discourse
and demonstrates the first key transition in his economic thinking. Comus’s
arguments to the Lady, Hoxby notes, resemble those made by Thomas Mun in
the 1620s that both ‘‘production and consumption were required to turn the
wheels of commerce’’ (20). They also resemble the arguments of the mercantilist theorists such as Mun insofar as they stress that the forces they invoke are
‘‘deterministic rather than normative.’’ The Lady’s response speaks to the economic vehicle rather than the sexual tenor of Comus’s arguments and invokes
an older tradition of economic thought, one that presupposes an inelastic supply of wealth and focuses on distributive justice. Insofar as we can assume that
Milton sides with the Lady, then he appears to oppose the new economic reasoning. Thus, as Hoxby notes, ‘‘it is remarkable to see how nearly Milton converges on Comus’s arguments for economic and sexual circulation in his tracts
of the 1640s’’ (24). Areopagitica, Hoxby argues, is indebted both to antimonopoly case law, and to contemporary arguments in favor of free trade. In it
Milton offers a ‘‘model of intellectual exchange that, relying on the theories
and arguments of free trade advocates, contended that men could best generate truth when they were left free to exercise their industry and employ their
skill in producing, venting and purchasing ideas in an open market’’ (26).
In the second section, Hoxby explores how Milton’s appropriation and
enlargement of economic ideas in his pamphlets of the 1640s was part of a
larger political discourse linking Republicanism with trade, a discourse which
then began to shift when Cromwell changed his foreign policy from fighting
England’s great trading rivals, the Dutch, to fighting the Spanish just as England went into a trade depression in 1658; this permitted the Royalists to
construct a vision of a restored monarch as a restoration of trade, and appropriate the language and imagery of earlier Republican encomiae to trade. At
this juncture Milton’s position also starts to shift again. Resisting any form of
strong centralized government, monarchical or otherwise, Milton argued instead, in The Readie and Easie Way, for a kind of federalism akin to that represented by the New England colonies and their proliferation of Puritan
congregations.
In the third section, Hoxby attends to the relationship between force and
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trade. Where in the earlier part of the seventeenth century trade had been invoked as an example of relationships based on ‘‘ ‘covenant or agreement’ ’’ in
contrast to ‘‘coercive modes of social and political organization’’ such as the
monarchy, after the Restoration another way of understanding trade as a fundamentally imperial activity gained discursive ground. It was actually the
Rump which translated this premise into politics thus forcing the restored
king ‘‘to live up to that example by re-imagining his empire in terms of trade
rather than dominion’’ (128). In this connection Hoxby examines Dryden’s
Annus Mirabilis as a celebration of the idea of England as a trading Empire
which has appropriated from the Dutch ‘‘mastery through violence of the sea
paths’’ (147), and traces a tradition of Royalist topographical poetry from Denham’s Coopers Hill to Pope’s Windsor Forest. Against this tradition he sets Paradise Lost, particularly the depiction of Paradise as the object of a Satanic
enterprise which is described in the ‘‘Restoration language of trade empire’’
(157), and Adam’s vision in Book 10 in which Hoxby finds a subtle deconstruction of the panoramic, even cartographic vision, which he argues
throughout this section, emerges in this period because of ‘‘trade’s natural resistance to modes of representation like narrative.’’ Where in Book 10 of The
Lusiads da Gama is vouchsafed a vision of future empire, Adam’s vision is deflated by Michael as a strictly fallen prospect: ‘‘the dream that scientific knowledge might promote the prosperity of the nation which might in turn help
England encompass the globe in a single empire of trade—all that is disregarded for faith, virtue, patience, temperance and love’’ (176).
Mammon’s Music concludes with a discussion of Samson Agonistes as ‘‘a
meditation on the consolations, obligations and temptations of laboring under
a hostile regime . . . undermin[ing] the Restoration’s politically inflected discourse of work, building, and production which, flourishing after the Fire of
London, looked to the world of goods for things beneath dispute and therefore
suitable as the basis for a society otherwise riven by religious and political differences’’ (204). Hoxby notes the similarity between the theater of the Philistines and depictions of the first and second Royal exchanges and reads
Samson’s decision to labor at the mill and ultimately to destroy the theater as
an attempt to construe work as embracing inward spiritual activity rather than
simply outward, economically productive activity.
Such a summary cannot do justice to the subtlety with which Hoxby pursues his argument. Perhaps the book’s greatest virtue is the fluidity with which
it charts both Milton’s position and those of other players in this discursive
field. The polarities which govern his narrative are not Royalist and Republican, millenarian and merchant for, as Hoxby ably demonstrates, all of these
parties are at one time or another enthusiastic participants in the process of
imagining England as a great trading nation and of imagining human society
in market terms. Milton in the 1640s thinks like Comus, Edmund Waller’s
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panegyric to the Lord Protector, ‘‘ ‘Ours is the harvest where the Indians mow.
We plough the deep, and reap what others sow’ ’’ (71), offers a vision that will
be fully evident in the pageantry that marked Charles II’s royal entry in 1661.
Perhaps most tellingly, Hoxby notes in the conclusion of his discussion of Paradise Lost’s negative representation of trade that, in ‘‘the values and habits of
thought that underlie its very rejection of the claims of institution and place,
its enlarged sense of human liberty and its profoundly abstract and mobile conception of the individual and the community alike [the poem nevertheless]
may have done more to promote the expansion of English trade, the growth
of the English economy, and the development of abstract economic analysis
than did the more overt imperialist ambitions of the Court and its poets’’
(177). Ultimately this opposition, between an anti-institutional conception of
an inward life and a vision of a great state dominating the oceans and bringing
wealth home to England is what organizes Hoxby’s argument and situates Milton. But, in a brilliantly telling reading he admits that in the long run of economic and social history even that opposition may not matter. ‘‘Milton himself
must have suspected how easily the personal powers of a paradise within
could be transformed into a different sort of individual initiative and accountability for his language insists that from Adam’s ‘by small/Accomplishing great
things’ (10.1457–58/ 12.566–67) to Mammon’s creating ‘great things of small’
(2.258) there is scarcely a slip’’ (177).
The book’s other great virtue is its richness of texture, the sheer abundance of material that it brings to bear on its topic, and its revelation of the
many borrowings, transformations and responses that give form to the discourse of trade. Hoxby turns his attention not just to the poetry and prose
writings relevant to his topic but to atlases, frontispieces, pageantry, paintings,
playing cards, and the decoration of Amsterdam’s City Hall, demonstrating the
sheer ubiquity of the discourse of trade and its inter-penetration of other topics. He has a fine ear (and eye) for telling repetition: thus he detects in Milton’s
focus on Samson’s destruction of the theater echoes of Sir Cheney Culpepper’s
prophecy that with the destruction of monopolies, ‘‘ ‘Babylon’ ’’ will ‘‘ ‘tumble,
tumble, tumble’ ’’ which in turn echoes John Owen’s exhortation to the Commonwealth Parliament to consider the example of Samson: ‘‘Now what are the
Pillars of that fatall building? Are they not the powers of the world as presently
stated and framed?’ ’’ (223). And he supports his argument that Adam’s vision
in Book 10 (of the first edition) is cartographic, a parody of the Restoration
fantasy of trade empire, by showing that the catalogue of places that meet
Adam’s eye, ‘‘Mombaza, and Quiloa, and Melind,/ And Sofala thought Ophir’’
(10/11.389–10) are the names that meet the eye in bold print in contemporary
sea atlases mapping the coast of Africa, a catalogue that also turns up on a
geographical playing card which describes ‘‘the Coast of Higher Ethiopia.’’
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Mammon’s Music deserves to be called ‘‘ground-breaking’’ in its careful situation of Milton’s writing in the context of the seventeenth-century discourses
of trade and rational economics. At the same time however, the book is methodologically rather conservative, to some degree an old historicist treatment of
subject matter brought into view by cultural materialism. Hoxby rejects the
notion ‘‘that a society shares a single mentality’’ (a proposition to which few
critics would actually subscribe these days) and notes that the methodological
consequence of this is that (contrary to New Historicist practice) he ‘‘limit[s]
the historical context in which [he] reads texts by asking what contemporary
events or strains of discourse these works seem either to invoke as their own
context or to suppress with a bad conscience’’ (10). So far so good; it is precisely Hoxby’s adherence to this limitation that makes his book so persuasive
in its general argument that Milton and other poets are deeply and consciously
engaged in the discourse of trade. At the same time however, it leaves him in
a position where he must take the claims and terms of argument of his protagonists more or less at face value; in other words, he leaves himself without a
set of analytical terms different from those of the essentially liberal tradition
which he finds Milton in particular articulating. (Marxism is acknowledged
and then dismissed without theoretical engagement in a footnote as ‘‘doing
more to hinder than to help the search for instructive answers’’) (257, n.26).
The Milton of Mammon’s Music is engaged in ‘‘economic thought,’’ not the reproduction of ideology. Moreover, when the emphasis on distributive justice
in A Masque gives way to an embrace of a ‘‘free and open marketplace of ideas’’
(40) in Areopagitica this demonstrates the development of Milton’s ‘‘thought’’
as do his subsequent shifts when he ‘‘sees the constraints that seemingly free
and uncoercive contractual relations could impose, once aggregated into market forces, on the moral life of individuals.’’ In other words, the Milton who
emerges in Hoxby’s account is in fact the very subject, reasoning and choosing
at every turn in never ceasing search for truth, that Milton so brilliantly conjures up in Areopagitica. My point is not simply that Milton is, in fact, merely
reproducing ideology, but rather that the practice of economic thought is one
of the more remarkable developments in the seventeenth-century European
transformation of subjectivity and to naturalize it, as Hoxby does is to sell
short part of his story, to ignore the way in which not just political content
and literary form but also the very forms of social experience are at stake in it.
But it is also the case that what Milton is doing in Areopagitica might be
better understood as producing (if not re-producing) ideology. Hoxby notes
in conclusion that Milton ‘‘chose to apply his mastery of economic logic, as
often as not to problems (like intellectual exchange or the preservation of
choice in the polity) that were not on the face of it economic. He thus made a
contribution not just to the literary representation of trade but, just as crucially, to the rise of economic analysis as a tool for thought, a way of looking
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at things’’ (238). But it remains a valid question whether applying economic
logic to problems not on the face of it (not essentially?) economic is a contribution to economic thought per se or to the naturalization of market models
(and whether this is a sustainable distinction). Certainly one of the more interesting features of the emergence of rational economic thought in this period is
the use of analogy to understand the elusive forces which determine economic
outcomes, a maneuver freighted with ideological implications as Hoxby notes
in his fine discussion of Comus’s arguments, but which nevertheless permitted
the development of the discipline of economics. But to go the other way, as
Milton does, abstracting the market model from actual economic forces such
as the costs and conditions of production, finance, transportation etc., ensures
that the model contributes little to understanding how markets work, but
much to linking them with ideas like freedom. And where Milton stops Hoxby
takes over, his occasionally anachronistic language reproducing a liberal world
view (‘‘rather than centralized planning, Milton’s system prizes experimentation,’’) whether he means to or not (83). The problem with Hoxby’s approach
is that it leaves him without a way to account theoretically for his book’s strongest insight: that Dryden’s mercantile Royalism and Milton’s personal paradise
both worked for England’s commercial ascendancy. While not exactly a single
mentality, there is nevertheless a totality posited here whose character I would
like to understand better.
Ultimately, however, it may be unfair to expect theoretical engagement on
top of everything else this book delivers. Its clarity and scope may in fact depend on suspending for the nonce questions like the difference between rational thought and ideology. Mammon’s Music is a magisterial delineation of a
fascinating subject and compelling reading, a truly remarkable achievement.



Elizabeth Hanson
Queen’s University

In Praise of Poverty: Hannah More Counters Thomas Paine and the Radical Threat
by Mona Scheuermann. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2002. Pp.
xiv Ⳮ 255. $36.00 cloth.
After the revisionism of recent decades, in which the long eighteenthcentury canon has expanded to accommodate many authors previously banished to its remote fringes, how many scholars of the period can profess to
have read widely in the works of Hannah More? One senses strongly that here
is a writer more talked about than read. There’s a good reason for this, perhaps, since much of More’s work in the 1790s, and particularly the writings
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for the poor that are the principal focus of Scheuermann’s book, was not calculated to impress or interest academic or intellectual tastes. Even if we accept
Scheuermann’s contentious claim that these writings were responsible (though
surely not so single-handedly as this book occasionally implies) for stalling the
French Revolution on its northwards expansion, a problem remains: More’s
output in the revolution decade can today seem extremely dull. The most useful aspect of In Praise of Poverty is thus its willingness to deal at length with
More’s important but unengaging conduct writings for the poor. The moral
fables and contrived dialogues which form Village Politics (1793) and the various Cheap Repository Tracts (1795–97) are thoroughly interrogated, though
the sheer level of detail can become a little wearing. (Some of the Tracts are
only slightly longer than Scheuermann’s ‘precis’ of them.) The discussion is
unleavened, moreover, by reference to Hannah More’s more ‘interesting’ writing: Strictures on the Modern System of Female Education (1799) is treated only
briefly at the end, while the early plays, and the works on slavery, merit no
more than occasional mention.
Scheuermann does not stint in expressing admiration for More’s gifts as
a ‘‘brilliant,’’ ‘‘marvellous,’’ if sometimes ‘‘repugnant’’ rhetorician, and for her
‘‘amazingly successful career,’’ as a writer able to ‘‘distill . . . the thought of the
powerful of her time’’ (4). More certainly kept impressive company, and was
soon close to the center of the conservative ascendancy of the period. Scheuermann provides an impressively thorough analysis of her associations and
friendships in the late ’80s and early ’90s, especially in her correspondence
with members of the Bluestocking Circle, the Bishop of London, David Garrick, and Horace Walpole. Walpole was among More’s advisors in her handling of Ann Yearsley, the Bristol milkwoman poet with whom she later
quarrelled. This compelling, scandalous interlude is now well known, and
pleasingly recounted here in an early chapter, but Scheuermann’s account
turns up no new facts or interpretations, though it is helpful to see the incident
in the light of More’s thought on poverty and lower-class deference and discipline generally, which is ably synthesized here. Yearsley’s name is perhaps too
often invoked in the rest of the book as a typical representative of the poor,
however: readers of the several recent extended studies of Yearsley will not
readily recognise her in this costume.
Much more problematically, the book’s central thesis—that More’s polemics successfully countered Paineite radicalism—is virtually unsubstantiated
and in the absence of reliable evidence, may indeed be unsupportable. I
wanted to hear much more about the composition of the audience for Village
Politics and the Tracts, and the range of its responses. Where are the testimonies of inflamed, Paine-toting peasants being successfully hosed down by
More’s common sense and contentedness? Where are the accounts of riotous
mobs halted in their tracks by a gratis copy of ‘‘The Lancashire Collier-Girl’’
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or ‘‘The Happy Waterman’’? Scheuermann offers ample evidence of the Tracts
meeting with the approval of More’s conservative friends, and of their widespread distribution (even to India and the West Indies), but other than a single
secondhand report from a York bookseller, who tells Bishop Porteus that the
people ‘‘were very fond of them’’ (101), there is no credible evidence of their
reception by the poor for whom they were written. Scholars of radical culture
in the 1790s have been a good deal more forthcoming about the relationship
between polemical texts, implied and real audiences, and political action:
Chase (1988), McCalman (1988), Worrall (1992), Mee (1992), Wood (1994),
Janowitz (1998) and Keen (1999), to mention only of a few of the principal
studies, have been able to demonstrate who in the radical underworld was
reading what, and how and with what effect such materials were circulated.
Scheuermann’s task is more difficult, of course, since calls to inaction are
somewhat less likely to prompt becalmed readers to record their sentiments.
In another kind of study—a stylistic analysis of this kind of conduct writing,
for example, which would make for an interesting project—this might not
matter so much, but the book is eager to announce its contextualising credentials. The materials chosen to illuminate More’s political thinking are refreshing but, in isolation, potentially perverse: an entire chapter, for example, titled
‘‘Conservative Contexts,’’ is devoted to Joseph Townsend’s Dissertation on the
Poor Laws while Burke’s Reflections, the more obvious (because more important) loyalist context, gets the scantest attention.
Other recent readers of Hannah More have been more sensitive to her
complex thinking and compelling personality by ‘‘dispensing,’’ as Angela
Keane puts it, ‘‘with the radical/reactionary binary’’ see ‘‘The Anxiety of (Feminine) Influence: Hannah More and the Counter-Revolution,’’ in Rebellious
Hearts: British Women Writers and the French Revolution, eds. Adriana Craciun
and Kari E. Lokke [New York: SUNY Press, 2001], 109, in order to accommodate her sometimes very different trains of thought on matters of class and
gender. Scheuermann has no truck, however, with the feminists of the 1980s
and ’90s (Myers and Kowaleski-Wallace especially) who, while sharing her
view that More is deeply reactionary on matters of rank and class mobility,
prefer to see More as in some respects a more cautious and productive thinker
on gender. For Scheuermann, to ‘‘misinterpret’’ More in this way is to ‘‘distort’’
her project (229, 239); Scheuermann’s More is a conservative on all matters,
social, political, and personal. The inflexibility of In Praise of Poverty in this
regard is matched by the depiction of More’s polemical work as entirely unchanging. This is probably an injustice to her subject, and there is evidence in
Scheuermann’s own summaries of More’s work of her thought undergoing
some intriguing shifts, both within and beyond the 1790s. For example, in
Village Politics, Tom Hod persuades Jack Anvil to reject the ideas of Paine, but
also urges him to resist burning his now-unwanted copy of The Rights of Man
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(‘‘let’s have no drinking, no riot, no bonfires’’); yet a later tale, ‘‘The Death of
Doctor Fantom’’ closes with the victory of the loyalist Mr. Trueman, who ‘‘set
fire to this combustible heap’’ of ‘‘assorted subversive pamphlets’’ (cited 121,
174). Despite discussing both of these works at some length, Scheuermann
makes no remark at all on this potentially interesting and fruitful discrepancy.
There are further disappointments: the book is at times inexpertly edited,
with both typographic and material errors remaining. The author also reaches
for the exclamation point with a frequency that is unusual (and unsettling) in
an academic study. Another stylistic gripe concerns the book’s inconsistent
and sometimes unappealingly jaunty tone. At one point, More’s (thoroughly
conventional) admiration of Soame Jenyns is described as a ‘crush’ (74), even
though the passage cited as evidence principally alludes not to Jenyns alone
but to his relationship with his wife.
For all Scheuermann’s efforts and for all this book’s virtues, I was left with
the feeling that Hannah More had won the ideological battle of the revolutionary decade in no more demonstrable or direct a way than Vera Lynn won the
Second World War. This is not to say that More is not worth studying: she is
a significant and complex thinker but her complexity is invariably reduced
when she is painted as a ‘‘pure,’’ unwavering conservative.
Tim Burke
St. Mary’s College, Strawberry Hill

